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Abstract 
  
This paper comprises the long introduction to the symposium of five papers on 
financial globalisation published in the Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
volume 34, no 2. The paper discusses the impact of financial globalisation in a 
variety of spheres and shows how the five papers link together to provide a 
coherent view of the current economic and financial crisis. In this paper we also 
examine the globalisation of finance more broadly both in historical terms as 
well as in relation to the current widespread failure in the financial markets. We 
take up the policy question of how the interests of the poor in particular, and 
developing countries in general, could be safeguarded from the vagaries of 
financial globalisation, questioning how much choice communities and 
countries have and what can the international community do to extend these 
choices?  
 
 
Keywords: Financial globalisation, crisis, institutional transformation and 
equity 
 
JEL Codes: G15, G18, G20, G21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found at 
www.cbr.cam.ac.uk 
1 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The most profound transformation of policy strategies in recent decades has 
been the widespread movement toward financial and other forms of 
liberalization. This, along with the repeal of the US 1933 Glass-Steagall Act in 
1999, which created the ‘parallel’ subprime mortgage market, engineered the 
August 2007 financial crisis. A crisis that was also promoted by the monetary 
policy pursued by most central banks around the globe with the single objective 
of price stability to be pursued by manipulating the rate of interest. A good deal 
of the literature has focused on issues surrounding the crises that have 
frequently ensued and the extent to which the efficiency of intermediation has 
been improved. Little analytical work has been on the issue of the relationship 
between financial development, institutional transformation and its effect on 
equity. The papers included in this special issue, analyze a variety of salient 
issues. And yet there is a common theme underlying the papers included in this 
special issue. This is that they explore at length financial globalisation and its 
impact in distinct areas. The first paper discusses the effects of financial 
globalisation, which are analysed with respect to global value chains and to 
subprime mortgages, applying the Miskyan approach. A second contribution 
examines the impact of foreign ownership of banks (itself an aspect of financial 
globalisation) on developing countries. The third paper examines 
financialisation developments from the point of view of the USA offshoring. A 
fourth paper examines the effects of financial globalisation, in the form of free 
capital flows, on poverty in developing countries. The fifth paper challenges the 
orthodox views on the effect of law on financial development and how the latter 
affects developing countries. 
 
This is a rather lengthy and focused introduction to show how the five papers 
are linked together to provide a coherent whole. It addresses the main focus of 
the special issue, which is Financial Globalisation and Crisis with its emphasis 
on Institutional Transformation and Equity. We examine in this introduction the 
issue of financial globalisation not only in relation to the specific papers but 
also within a wider perspective linking it to the current turmoil in financial 
markets. We take up the policy question of how the interest of the poor in 
particular, and developing countries in general, could be safeguarded from the 
vagaries of financial globalisation. How much choice do communities and 
countries have and what can the international community do to enhance these 
choices. 
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2. Financial globalisation and the studies in the CJE issue 
 
Gary Dymski’s contribution entitled, ‘Why the Subprime Crisis is Different: A 
Minskyian Approach’, uses Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis to 
explore the question of why the 2007-2008 subprime crisis has been so deep 
and persistent, and why it has triggered forces that have undermined the entire 
trajectory of global economic growth (Dymski, 2010). Dymski poses a 
challenge: if so many contemporary observers have acknowledged the current 
crisis as a ‘Minsky crisis’, why then is it that this crisis has been so resistant to 
precisely the sort of ‘lender-of-last-resort’/‘big government’ policy 
interventions that Minsky suggested should suffice to prevent worsened 
outcomes for economies gripped by financial instability? Resolving this 
conundrum requires appreciating that there were some assumptions about the 
economic role of banks, which have been subsequently eroded by institutional 
changes. In effect, Minsky built up his ideas on the basis of the 1960s and 1970s 
experience; but after 1980, the role of banking and financial dynamics in the 
economy was transformed. 
 
Dymski identifies several key implicit assumptions in Minsky’s model, and he 
argues that it is the successive undermining of these assumptions by historical 
developments that explains the unprecedented scale of the current financial 
crisis. The first involves racial/ethnic discrimination in the credit market. In 
putting his model together, Minsky paid no attention to the problem of racial 
exclusion in credit markets. For one thing, he focused on commercial and 
industrial loans; further, when he was writing, exclusion for minority applicants 
and areas prior to the 1990s took the form of higher rates of loan denial. This 
changed in the 1990s, when racial exclusion was embodied in various forms of 
predatory loans, most notably, subprime loans. Dymski shows that subprime 
loans, that is, mortgage loans made at high interest rates, with large fees and 
penalty clauses, were pioneered in minority areas. What made these loans 
feasible was the development of securitization for higher-risk loans, which 
permitted banks to move these loans off their balance-sheets. This meant that 
the focus of banks’ revenue-generation shifted from lending margin to fee-based 
income.  
 
Second, Minsky did not trace out the implications of the USA being a global 
liquidity sink. From the 1980s onward, the USA has consistently run current-
account deficits, and thus had capital-account surpluses. These surpluses have 
flooded the USA asset markets with funds seeking investment outlets. This has 
altered the USA’s financial dynamics, by keeping interest rates lower than they 
otherwise would be; and this, in turn, permitted subprime loans to be used 
systematically to finance home purchases when the gap between borrowers’ 
income and housing prices spiralled out of control. A third extension of 
3 
 
Minsky’s ideas involves identifying, and then generalizing, another 
unacknowledged assumption: that is, that banks (the lenders) are more highly 
leveraged than households or firms (the borrower units); and banks have the 
lowest ratio of capital to assets of any economic sector or subsector. This 
assumption is invisible, because Minsky, in defining robust, hedge, and Ponzi 
units, focused solely on whether expected cash-flows are positive or negative. 
Loan commitments become unsustainable because they generate negative cash-
flows. But while Minsky pays no attention to sectoral leverage or solvency, 
Dymski argues that these dimensions have become crucial in the current crisis.  
 
When Minsky formulated his ideas, banks’ sectoral balance sheets were more 
leveraged than those of either the household or firm sectors. Thus, the banking 
sector was more exposed to the risks of asset losses and income downturns than 
non-bank sectors. Central bank interventions focused on the banking sector on 
the assumption that they could restore financial stability before other sectors’ 
balance sheets were systematically thrown into disarray. But in the past several 
years, structured investment vehicles (SIVs), even more leveraged than banks, 
became an important provider of credit for mortgage (and other forms of) 
finance. In this situation, central-bank interventions, aimed as they are at 
stabilizing banks’ cash flows and balance sheets, have not succeeded in 
stabilizing the economy. Injections of liquidity, and eventually equity, into the 
banking system could not prevent the spread of insolvencies and failures among 
household and non-financial business units.  So contrary to Minsky’s model, 
lender-of-last-resort interventions could not forestall the meltdown. 
 
Howard Stein in his contribution, entitled ‘Financial Liberalisation, Institutional 
Transformation and Credit Allocation in Developing Countries: The World 
Bank and the Internationalisation of Banking’, continues with the recent 
financial crisis and the role of the World Bank in it (Stein, 2010). Stein argues 
that in the wake of two decades of financial crises following exercises of 
orthodox financial reform, the World Bank in their reports focused not on 
critically analysing problems with the strategy itself but instead on a series of 
extraneous explanations. These included the incorrect order of financial 
liberalisation, incomplete liberalisation including too much state ownership of 
banks, inadequate liberalisation in other markets, state cronyism, inadequate 
prudential regulations, poor corporate governance and too much industrial 
policy. While there were some minor modifications in the liberalisation 
strategies (such as paying closer attention to the order of liberalisation) financial 
crises continued after the mid-1990s in the wake of liberalisation frequently 
sponsored by the Bank. Beginning in 1999, the continued disappointing results 
led the Bank to innovate once again by promoting the selling off the banking 
sector to foreign owners, which they believe would help improve ‘sector 
efficiency and stability’. The World Bank argue that the existence of foreign 
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banks is likely to have the effect of pushing local banks into Small and Medium 
Enterprise (SME) markets, where they have a greater comparative advantage.  
The question of access to credit for the private sector, particularly the locally 
owned small and medium size enterprises, is central to the issue of employment 
generation and poverty reduction in developing countries where the bulk of new 
jobs are typically created by these companies. 
 
After documenting the very rapid rise of foreign banking in the past 10 years or 
so in all regions, the paper traces the development of the World Bank’s agenda 
on foreign ownership by reviewing World Bank documents published in the 
1980s and 1990s. In the 1980s the key was privatization, which did not 
differentiate foreign and domestic private banks, which began to change after 
1997. The lack of evidence particularly to counter the downside risks to lending 
to small enterprises clearly bothered the Bank. Four Bank economists set out to 
disprove this and in fact to illustrate the opposite in four Latin American 
countries (Clarke et al., 2005). However, and as discussed in the paper, they do 
not use data on lending to small businesses in every country but on loan size 
(for Argentina and Peru) and debt size (for Chile), which they use as a proxy for 
small businesses. But this is a problematic approach since large businesses 
might have either low debt levels or low loan levels relative to assets, which 
would make them highly attractive to make loans. Only in Columbia do they 
actually use data on lending to small businesses based on the size of the 
enterprise. Not surprisingly the overall portion is extremely tiny compared to 
the others, which is what is expected to be the case. The initial evidence 
provided illustrates that in four countries (Peru, Columbia, Argentina and Chile) 
foreign ownership is overwhelmingly associated with slower growth and lower 
share of lending to small businesses. This is a result we would expect but not 
consistent with the agenda. They, therefore, take it a step further to explore 
domestic vs. foreign bank lending by size category and discover that the larger 
foreign banks have a higher portion and greater growth of lending than small 
banks to ‘smaller businesses’ (see, also, Detragiache et al., 2006). 
  
The paper also presents data from Zambia, Uganda and other SSA countries, 
which had rapid selling off of their banks to foreign ownership. The evidence is 
quite disturbing and includes poor financial development, rising costs of 
financial intermediation, declining lending to the private sector and increasing 
capital flight as foreign banks invest more of their assets abroad. This is a 
disturbing trend particularly in the wake of large-scale financial instability, 
which could expose foreign banks at risk. In addition, the paper discusses the 
tendency, particularly in Hungary and other Eastern and Central Europe, for 
foreign banks to lend in foreign currency. In the wake of rapid devaluations, this 
is greatly increasing the risk of financial instability of local companies that have 
taken foreign loans, which could lead to default, further financial crisis and 
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grave consequences to the domestic economies.  
 
William Milberg and Deborah Winkler in ‘Financialization and the Dynamics 
of Off-shoring in the USA’, turn their attention to corporate strategy in the USA 
(Milberg and Winkler, 2010). They begin with the observation that, beginning 
in the 1980s and gaining strength in the 1990s, corporate strategy in the USA 
shifted, focusing more on the maximization of shareholder value and less on 
long-term growth. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) refer to this as the shift from 
‘retain and reinvest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’. The transformation involved a 
reduction in investment out of retained earnings and an increase in the purchase 
of financial assets, and, most recently, a massive purchase by corporations of 
their own shares (share buybacks) aimed at raising stock prices. This 
‘financialization of the non-financial corporate sector’ in the USA has been well 
documented by Epstein (2005) and others, and some recent studies have 
connected financialization directly to reduced capital investment, including 
Stockhammer (2004) and Orhangazi (2008).  In this paper, Milberg and Winkler 
focus on the corresponding real-side aspects of this corporate strategy shift, and 
in particular on its international dimension. The authors note that the emphasis 
on maximizing shareholder value and aligning management interests with those 
of shareholders emerged around the same time that management experts advised 
corporations to reduce the scope of corporate activity to focus on ‘core 
competence’, and to outsource other operations. Milberg and Winkler find that 
the expansion of global production networks has served a dual purpose in the 
evolving corporate strategy. First, cost reductions from the globalization of 
production have by raising profits through a ‘mark-up effect’, and second, by 
reducing the need for domestic reinvestment of those profits, off-shoring has 
freed up earnings for the purchase of financial assets and the pursuit of higher 
shareholder returns.  
 
Over the past 20 years USA corporate profits rose and the profit share of 
national income reached a 40-year high. At the same time, USA corporations 
faced price competition in product markets and thus slow-rising product prices 
at home. To maintain cost mark-ups and profits, firms shifted their corporate 
strategy to control of costs, in part by expanding their global production 
networks. Such off-shoring accounts for up to 27% of goods input purchases in 
some USA industries, 50% or more of USA imports, and provides reported cost 
savings of 20-60%.  Imports are linked to higher cost mark-ups and firm profits 
and the gains from such non-competitive imports – the result of off-shoring – 
are increasingly associated with the reinvestment of these higher profits.  
 
Milberg and Winkler conclude that financialization and globalization have 
reinforced each other for USA non-financial corporations and, despite the 
corporate sector’s contribution to national savings over the past decade, the 
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offshoring-financialization linkage reduces the capacity of non-financial 
corporations to act as a driver of the recovery from the economic crisis that 
emerged in 2008. Having narrowed increasingly to core competence beginning 
in the early 1990s as part of the financialization process, USA non-financial 
corporations today are ill equipped to reverse course and focus on innovation 
and growth through reinvestment of profits. Milberg and Winkler survey the top 
30 firms in terms of share repurchases and dividend payments and conclude that 
firms with extensive global supply chains undertook massive share buybacks in 
the 2000s. IT hardware and software manufacturers (Cisco, Microsoft, Hewlett 
Packard, Dell and Intel), retailers (Wal-Mart and Home Depot), and consumer 
non-durables firms (Procter & Gamble) that rely heavily on sophisticated global 
value chain arrangements, were among those returning the highest levels of 
dividends and share buybacks. 
 
The situation has important implications for the analysis of international trade 
and finance. Research on international trade has emphasized the effects of trade 
liberalization on the relative wages of high-skill and low-skill workers. In their 
paper, Milberg and Winkler emphasize the importance of trade for markups, the 
profit share and, in turn, investment and financialization. These are better 
understood as the ‘dynamic’ aspects of offshoring, a term borrowed from the 
literature on classical trade models that emphasize the relation between imports 
and the profit rate, with its implications for capital accumulation and economic 
growth; and in terms of this paper financialization should be added as well. 
 
Philip Arestis and Asena Caner in their paper entitled ‘Capital Account 
Liberalization and Poverty: How Close is the Link?’ begin with the observation 
that the number of poor people in the world is shocking (Arestis and Caner, 
2010). According to the latest statistics, there are still more than 1 billion poor 
people in the world, despite the recent decent increase in average living 
standards.  There are also dramatic differences in poverty among developing 
countries. Even more worrying is the recent statement by the IMF (2008) that 
the current financial crisis threatens severely poverty in low-income countries in 
particular. The paper by Arestis and Caner focuses on the financial aspects of 
poverty alleviation in developing countries and asks whether capital account 
liberalization can actually lead to lower poverty in developing countries. This 
study contributes to the literature by examining both theoretically and 
empirically the relationship between capital account liberalization and poverty 
for the first time. They focus on developing countries and exclude developed 
countries from their sample for two reasons. First, the nature and the extent of 
poverty in developing countries requires more urgent attention; and second, the 
dynamics of poverty reduction are different in these countries than in developed 
countries. This is important, especially when cross-country heterogeneity is a 
major concern.  
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Theory provides conflicting predictions regarding the relationship between 
capital account liberalization and poverty alleviation. On the one hand, by 
diminishing information and transaction costs and therefore allowing more 
entrepreneurs to obtain external finance, capital account liberalization improves 
the allocation of capital, thereby exerting a positive impact on the poor. To the 
extent that financial systems function better following capital account 
liberalization, financial services become available to a larger proportion of the 
population and to the poor. On the other hand, capital account liberalization and 
improvements in the financial system primarily benefit the rich and those who 
are politically connected. Especially at the early stages of capital account 
liberalization, financial services, and credit in particular, are available to the 
wealthy and connected. A greater degree of capital account liberalization, then, 
may only succeed in channelling more capital to the few, but certainly not to the 
poor. Therefore, the overall effect is ambiguous. 
 
Arestis and Caner use dynamic panel econometric methods and data for 
developing countries to test whether capital account liberalization influences 
poverty. They demonstrate that capital account liberalization does little to 
alleviate poverty. By contrast, it is the design of high quality institutions, and to 
a much lesser extent economic growth, that affect poverty alleviation. All 
regression results suggest that capital account liberalization is not associated 
with a significant decrease in the poverty rate or an increase in the income share 
of the poor. In fact, liberalization of the capital account increases poverty 
according to some estimates. Another finding is that there is no threshold effect 
of liberalization. Furthermore, in their econometric analysis they control for the 
possibility of endogeneity of the capital account liberalization variable as well 
as for the other explanatory variables.  
 
These findings are in fact not surprising when we think about the living 
conditions of the poor in developing countries. These people are mostly 
unskilled self-employed people, working on their extremely small-sized farms, 
or as artisans or small-scale entrepreneurs in shops or homes. The main 
constraints they face are marketing, credit, insurance and infrastructure. Such 
needs often require competent domestic policy-making and cannot be expected 
to be fulfilled by foreign investors. Moreover, if the needs of these people are 
not met, capital account liberalization may increase their vulnerability by 
leaving them open to intense competition from the outside world. The financial 
crisis of August 2007 and the subsequent spread of it in the rest of the economy 
and the world, does not augur well at all for the poor, especially so in the 
developing world. The conclusions of this contribution become even more 
relevant and timely. They also support the IMF (2008) view referred to above, 
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which is even more worrying in the context of this conclusion.   
 
Prabirjit Sarkar and Ajit Singh in their contribution entitled ‘Law, Finance and 
Development. Further Analyses of Longitudinal Data’, study the relationship 
between law, finance and development (Sarkar and Singh, 2010). In the 
controversial ‘legal origin’ hypothesis it is claimed that legal differences 
between countries can be categorized, quantified and analysed. The proponents 
of the hypothesis have come up with evidence showing that countries belonging 
to the ‘common-law family’ (UK and other countries) have higher protection 
for shareholders and greater rights for creditors than do countries belonging to 
the ‘civil law’ legal family [France and other countries]. The legal systems not 
only differ with respect to protection for shareholders, but also with respect to 
labour, contract enforcement and self-dealing rules, among other attributes.  
 
It is argued that common law works better than civil law and is more conducive 
to economic development for the following reason. Judges interpret the law in 
common law countries whereas in civil law countries Judges are bound by long 
explicit laws and codes, leaving them with little discretion.  This evolution of 
the difference between the two systems (common law and civil law system) has 
occurred over the last 300 years and has continued to affect development of 
laws to the present day.  The policy implications of this ‘legal origin’ hypothesis 
are far reaching. Essentially their argument is that the Anglo-Saxon model 
based on English common law is most conducive to the protection of 
shareholders; more broadly, to safeguarding property rights, and freedom of 
contracts.  As a consequence, common law country firms have greater access to 
outside finance, are less subject to government control and have faster corporate 
growth. These characteristics in turn generate faster growth of national income. 
 
On that basis it is suggested that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate law 
represents the end of history as there is wide consensus that main corporate goal 
should be shareholders’ wealth maximization subject to constraints of liquid 
stock markets. The ‘legal origin’ hypothesis is very much disputed by the 
modern scholars of corporate law.  For example, under current French practice 
judges interpret the law whereas English judges on the other hand have less 
scope than before in view of the detailed descriptions contained in modern 
English law, such as the company law. The French judges are also able to have 
discretions by appealing to the Roman law concept of ‘good faith’. In this 
perspective an interdisciplinary research project on law, finance and 
development has been going on at the Centre for Business Research (CBR), 
University of Cambridge. The project involves both economists and lawyers. It 
has prepared new longitudinal data on legal protection of shareholders as well 
as on creditors’ rights and labour rights over a 36 year period, 1970-2005 for 
four OECD countries (UK, France, Germany and the USA) and India. Sarkar 
9 
 
and Singh are mainly concerned in their contribution with the question of 
protection for shareholders in four OECD countries and its impact on stock 
market development.   
 
The analysis and empirical results provided by the authors, lead to two rather 
different kinds of conclusions. The first is the narrow technical finding that the 
‘legal’ origin hypothesis concerning shareholder protection and stock market 
development is not sustained by the analysis of the longitudinal data employed 
in the Sarkar and Singh paper. The second conclusion, which follows from the 
paper’s analysis, concerns policy.  The results of the studies carried out by the 
proponents of the ‘legal origin’ hypothesis have been used by organisations 
such as the World Bank to suggest that developing countries should reform their 
laws to adopt the common law, and to follow the Anglo-Saxon model to foster 
economic development.  The norm of shareholder wealth maximisation subject 
to the constraints of liquid stock markets has been propagated as a universal 
standard. The empirical findings of the Sarkar and Singh paper cast serious 
doubt on the validity of the basic theses of the Anglo Saxon legal and 
developmental model. This evidence is more compatible with the ‘varieties of 
capitalism thesis’, which suggest that each country has its own form of 
capitalism and its own legal and regulatory institutions, and that there is no 
single development model which can cover all their needs. The overall 
conclusion of the Sarkar and Singh paper is, then, that the findings of the ‘legal 
origin’ hypothesis in its original strong form are not sustainable with respect to 
the issues of law, financial globalisation and growth.  
 
3. Linking the CJE papers to the theme of financialisation 
 
The CJE special issue provides a number of insights into its main theme. The 
rights of shareholders, racial and ethnic minorities access to finance for 
mortgages and their relationship to changes underlying the subprime mortgage 
crisis; the expansion of foreign ownership of banking on small and medium size 
enterprises access to finance; the impact of financialization among lead firms in 
global value chains on the income of suppliers in developing countries; the 
consequences of capital account liberalization on poverty and the question of 
the relationship between law, finance and development from a number of 
angles. The special issue has attempted to evaluate these relationships. The 
approach in all papers is heavily informed by an institutional approach to 
understanding the relationship between finance and equity. As such it provides a 
coherent approach to our understanding of financial globalisation, institutional 
transformation and equity.  
 
It would be constructive to make a few comments on how each paper addresses 
each of the issues that have been highlighted in this introduction. We may begin 
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with the financial globalization and crisis aspect. Dymski’s analysis on Minsky 
and the USA massive current account deficit that flooded the asset markets, 
thereby allowing the creation of the subprime mortgage market, huge leveraging 
and internationalization of loan bundles, and the associated derivatives, has 
created a huge crisis on the non-banking side as well as on the banking side. 
Stein makes the  argument that foreign ownership of the banking sector has 
contributed to the globalization of finance; evidence on this can be adduced 
from foreign banks, even in poor developing countries, are exporting capital to 
diversify assets abroad. This produces the potential for serious crises. The 
Milberg and Winkler paper provides an interesting link between the 
globalization of production and the financialization of profits. It exposes 
companies to terrible crisis in view of loss of internal funds to declining stock 
market prices and the extent to which companies are investing in other forms of 
global assets. This provides weak ability to recover in the face of crisis due to 
an erosion of internal capacities from outsourcing, and being subjected to the 
whims of bankruptcies elsewhere. In the Arestis and Caner contribution, capital 
account liberalization greatly increases volatility and crisis, thereby exposing 
domestic economies to the whims of capital flows and the financial meltdown 
we are now witnessing. In the Sarkar and Singh paper, the adoption of the 
Anglo-American model strengthens the role of the stock market. This can 
contribute to financial instability by causing rapid outflows from stock markets 
during economic downturns thereby precipitating financial crises. This can of 
course worsen equity because capital outflows are likely to hurt employment 
and are also likely to cause a decline in the standard of living due to the impact 
of potential devaluation. 
 
Turning to the institutional transformation dimension, the multifaceted and rich 
interpretation of institutional transformation is all highly relevant to our 
understanding of the changing nature of international finance. Dymsky shows 
how the changing nature of institutional arrangements, creates the securitization 
of subprime loans and the resulting institutionalization of new non-bank 
financial leveraging. Stein is concerned with the changing nature of banking 
organizations and how they fit into the institutionalization of global strategies of 
accumulation. Milberg and Winkler show how institutional changes in 
production and new habits of thought can deal with the utilization of profits and 
the non-productive behaviour that is associated with it. Arestis and Caner 
examine the institutionalization of new capital account arrangements and their 
false rationalization as a poverty reducer. And finally Sarkar and Singh on 
transforming laws, which are an important part of institutions in developing 
countries, by pressing a singular vision the World Bank, which is imposing a 
new global institutional standard that is quite dangerous. 
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In terms of equity, Dymsky deals with new forms of exploitation of poor using 
subprime markets likely to be the first in line for foreclosure. Stein looks at the 
erosion of lending to small and medium size enterprises domestically in view of 
the foreign ownership of domestic banks' export of capital from poor to rich 
countries by transnational banks. This is undertaken through practices such as 
hard currency lending, which can lead to problems in enterprises in developing 
countries with serious consequences to employment. Milberg and Winkler point 
towards the loss of employment and pressure on wages from new practices of 
outsourcing. Also, stock purchases mean less money for improvements in 
productivity with implications for wages. Arestis and Caner focus on poverty 
with implications for equity. And finally Sarkar and Singh deal with the 
consequences for economic growth and crisis for equity in an Anglo-American 
system of laws. 
 
4. Financial globalization: controversy over theory and evidence1 
 
The above analysis has indicated how the individual contributions included in 
this special issue relate to various aspects of financial globalization.  In this and 
the following sections we explore other important dimensions of financial 
globalization, paying particular attention to its theoretical underpinnings and 
also how it has contributed to the current world financial turmoil.  
 
In general terms, the issue of financial globalization generates acute controversy 
in relation to theory and empirical evidence as well as policy. However, recently 
there has been some blurring of the ideological divide. For example, Jagdish 
Bhagwati (2000), an orthodox icon of free trade, regards financial globalization 
as a conspiracy between Wall Street and the US Treasury providing the 
financial leaders of the Street and the Treasury greater leverage over economic 
policy making in developing countries.  However, Bhagwati’s (op. cit.) serious 
point is that trade liberalization is a rather different kettle of fish than 
liberalization of finance (see further below).   
 
This perspective has been seriously challenged by Stanley Fischer (1997), a 
former Deputy Managing Director of the IMF and by the former Treasury 
Secretary, Larry Summers (2000).  Fischer suggests that, at a theoretical level, 
financial globalization in the form of capital account liberalization would lead 
to global economic efficiency, allocation of world savings to those who are able 
to use them most productively, and would thereby increase social welfare.  
Citizens of countries with free capital movements would be able to diversify 
their portfolios and thereby increase their risk-adjusted rates of return. It would 
enable corporations in these countries to raise capital in international markets at 
a lower cost. It is suggested, moreover, that such liberalisation leads to further 
development of a country's financial system which in turn is thought to enhance 
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productivity in the real economy by facilitating transactions and by better 
allocation of resources. Some argue that free capital movements will help 
increase world welfare through another channel, namely transferring resources 
from ageing populations and lower rates of return in advanced countries to 
younger populations and higher rates of return in newly industrialising 
economies.  Such resource transfers will be Pareto optimal as both rich and poor 
countries would gain (Fischer, 1997). 
 
Summers (2000) succinctly sums up the core point of the orthodox perspective 
as follows:  ‘… the abstract argument for a competitive financial system 
parallels the argument for competitive markets in general … Just as trade in 
goods across jurisdictions has benefits, so too will intertemporal trade and trade 
that shares risks across jurisdictions have benefits’ (page 3). 
 
The theoretical case against the view that unfettered capital movements are 
essential for maximising the gains from trade and world economic welfare has 
been made by a number of economists from different schools of thought.  First 
within the neoclassical tradition itself, Stiglitz (2000) argues that the concept of 
free movements of capital is fundamentally different from that of free trade in 
goods. Capital flows are subject to asymmetric information, agency problems, 
adverse selection, and moral hazard, and incomplete capital markets.  Although 
such problems may occur also in trade in goods and services, they are intrinsic 
to financial flows and are far more important. Thus, it is suggested that 
liberalisation in the trade for widgets is rather different than the free movement 
of financial products between countries.  Therefore, it is far from obvious that 
the welfare propositions of the theory of international trade carry over to the 
case of free movement of finance. 
 
Further, Keynesian critics of the orthodoxy emphasise that financial markets are 
particularly prone to co-ordination failures and often generate multiple 
equilibria, some good, some bad.  In the absence of appropriate coordination by 
the government or international authorities, an economy may languish in a low 
level equilibrium, producing sub-optimal output and employment levels.2 
 
The post-Keynesian economists (see for example Davidson, 2001), take a more 
radical stance. They put forward analyses and evidence in favour of Keynesian 
thesis that flexible exchange rates and free international capital mobility are 
incompatible with global full employment and rapid economic growth in an era 
of multilateral free trade’. These economists also challenge the orthodox 
presumption that transparency and availability of more information would make 
the financial markets less prone to crisis. They point out that the crises are 
fundamentally due to the fact that the future is uncertain and people have 
different perceptions about it. 
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To sum up, the orthodox theory that financial liberalisation leads to global 
economic efficiency based on the analogy with free trade is flawed on several 
counts. Within the neoclassical tradition itself, it is the intrinsic nature of 
financial contracts which differentiates a market for the latter from that of 
ordinary goods in international trade.  The Keynesian and the post-Keynesian 
emphasis is on inherent uncertainty about the future, on speculation and the 
macro-economic co-ordination failures at both the national and international 
levels to which financial markets are particularly prone.  
 
Empirical findings contradict orthodox theory that suggests that financial 
liberalization and new financial instruments should lead to consumption 
smoothing rather than crises, which has been the observed outcome of many 
episodes of financial liberalization in developing countries in recent decades. 
There have been several huge financial and economic crises in emerging 
markets since the 1990s: Mexico (1994): Indonesia, Korea and Thailand (1997); 
Brazil and Russia (1998); Argentina and Turkey (2000); Brazil (2002). These 
crises have usually followed capital account liberalization.3 . The reasons for the 
observed disjuncture between theory and reality in the context of financial 
liberalization are now well understood. The more important reasons include a) 
the inherent volatility of capital flows due to irrational exuberance or 
unwarranted pessimism on the part of investors; b) increased competition 
among banks following liberalization, leading to risk-taking and bank failures; 
c) the changes in the global financial system and the short-termism of the 
leading international actors (see Singh, 2001, for further analysis). 
 
Until recently, empirical studies on the effects of capital account liberalization 
on economic growth generally produced conflicting results.  However, Prasad et 
al (2003), an IMF econometric study, concluded that capital account 
liberalization may or may not promote growth but it certainly increases the 
volatility of consumption, which undoubtedly has a negative effect on welfare. 
These results although at variance with the IMF policy stance, were very much 
in line with those of many independent economists.  The Fund economists do 
not easily give up.  Thus, the IMF’s 2006 econometric study, Kose et al. (2006), 
claimed that the methodology used in this and their 2003 research was incapable 
of detecting all the positive effects of capital account liberalization on welfare. 
Further, the 2006 study suggested that there was indeed a beneficial impact on 
some indicators of welfare, including corporate governance, and also indirectly 
on economic discipline. These conclusions have, however, been carefully 
considered and rejected by Ocampo et al. (2008).  
 
 
 
14 
 
 
5. Financial globalization and the current economic turmoil 
 
After the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, many developing countries in Asia and 
elsewhere are once again faced with the prospect of another devastating crisis. 
The meltdown of the financial system in many advanced countries is affecting 
the real economies in both developed and developing countries. It will be 
appreciated that the real world economy has been performing strongly during 
the last five years. Apart from China and India, which have displayed stellar 
performances, many other developing countries have also grown relatively fast, 
notably in Africa. However, the world economy has also been subject to serious 
financial imbalances. These imbalances include the ever increasing US current 
account deficit which rose from three per cent of GDP in 1999 to over five per 
cent from 2004 onwards. One imbalance, which may be regarded as 
pathological is the fact that among the G7 countries real GDP has been growing 
faster in countries with current account deficits (for example the US) and slower 
in those with current account surpluses (Germany, for example). In other words, 
financial markets were penalizing virtue and rewarding profligacy. Yet another 
pathological symptom was the fact that funds have been flowing from poor to 
rich countries (China to the US, for example), contrary to the expectations of 
conventional economic theory.  
 
In the wake of the Asian crisis, most developing countries did not strengthen 
capital account controls so as to further regulate international financial flows. 
Instead, they began to implement a strategy of building up large foreign 
exchange reserves to avert future financial crises. In view of the strong 
performance of the Chinese and Indian real economies, the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) expected that not only would these countries be able 
to protect themselves from financial turmoil originating in advanced countries 
but also to continue to remain sources of fast growth of demand for the world’s 
economies. 
 
However, as Krugman (2008) notes the script changed abruptly:  
 
‘What happened? Alongside the growth of the shadow banking 
system, there was another transformation in the character of the 
financial system over the past fifteen years - namely, the rise of 
financial globalization with investors in each country holding large 
stakes in other countries … this change was supposed to reduce 
risk: because US investors had much of their wealth abroad, they 
were less exposed to a slump in America, and because foreign 
investors held much of their wealth in the US, they were less 
exposed to a slump overseas. But a large part of the increase in 
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financial globalization actually came from the investments of 
highly leveraged financial institutions which were making various 
sorts of risky cross-border bets. And when things went wrong in 
the US these cross-border investments acted as what economists 
call a “transmission mechanism”, allowing a crisis that started with 
the US housing market to drive fresh rounds of crises overseas,’ (p. 
4).4  
 
To prevent the global crisis becoming worse, it is necessary for nation states to 
act in concert and to avoid the mistakes of the 1930s (beggar thy neighbour 
policies, competitive devaluations etc). This time round the leaders of the world 
economy have already met and agreed to countercyclical fiscal action in 
developed and developing countries. They have agreed to protect the global 
financial system from a melt-down. For the first time, developing countries such 
as China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia are taking countercyclical measures to 
ward off recession. UBS (a major Swiss bank) has estimated that the combined 
effect of emerging and developed economies’ fiscal stimuli will see a fiscal 
boost of 1.5 per cent of world GDP in 2009 (Economist, Economic Focus, A 
Stimulating Question. December 13, 2008). It remains to be seen whether this 
stimulus and associated policy measures will be enough to restore confidence in 
the financial system and avert a deep global recession, mass unemployment, and 
worsening of poverty levels.5 
 
Many analysts expect an end to the fall in the US housing market in 2010, 
which will provide a major boost to confidence and hopefully new lending. In 
that case there is a reasonable chance that world economic growth may not 
decline by more than 1 or 2 per cent. Notably if that were to happen it would be 
the first actual decline of world GDP in any year in the period since the Second 
World War. By past historical standards, such a slow-down can be considered  
small. As Llewlyn (2008) notes, in the 1920s, the peak to trough fall in GDP in 
the major economies averaged 12 per cent, ranging from around 30 per cent in 
the US and Canada and somewhat under 10 per cent in Japan, Italy and Britain. 
If world GDP in the present crisis were to fall by only 1 or 2 per cent before 
recovering, this should justifiably be regarded as a triumph not only for policy-
makers but also for the economic analyses which constitute the foundation for 
the measures adopted.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The Financial Times (2 January 2009) recently argued that, although financial 
markets are bad, they are nevertheless a necessary evil. It suggests that the 
world economy works best when international financial markets function under 
appropriate regulation. Widespread research suggests that free international 
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flows of financial capital do not always serve the needs of developing countries. 
This conclusion was also reached by the League of Nations economists on the 
basis of their analysis of European economies during the 1920s and 1930s (see, 
for example, Nurkse (1944), Felix (2003) and Eichengreen (2001). This was the 
reason why, when the IMF Articles of Agreement were negotiated at Bretton 
Woods, they contained strong provisions to prevent capital account 
liberalization. However, during the last two decades, under the idealogical 
hegemony of neoliberalism and Washington Consensus, the IFIs have done 
their best to subvert the spirit of these agreements. Indeed, in 1997, IMF 
officials presented a formal proposal to change the relevant Articles of the 
Agreement so as to make the promotion of ‘orderly’ capital account 
liberalization one of the important duties of the IMF. In the event, however, this 
proposal was quietly shelved in view of the Asian economic crisis. 
Nevertheless, this has not deterred the IFIs from encouraging or condoning 
capital account liberalization.  
 
It is usually forgotten that, following the foreign exchange shock of the late 
1920s, several developing countries prospered during the depression by virtue 
of their efforts to restructure their economies and industrialize by adopting 
protectionist measures. Madison (1985) noted that those developing countries 
that followed orthodox economic policies, as for example India and Cuba, did 
not fare so well as the Latin American countries in the 1930s. Other evidence 
suggests that both well-calibrated protection and capital controls can be useful 
for promoting economic development.6  
 
To conclude, cooperation between developed and developing countries on 
international financial matters is required to develop new institutional 
arrangements to counteract the effects of financial globalization. Signs of this 
are already emerging, as for example, the recent summit of 20 developed and 
developing countries. To be relevant to the 21st century, the IMF needs to put 
development first and to have new institutional arrangements giving developing 
countries a full role regarding all policy issues and related decisions 
commensurate with their numbers and their rising GDP.  
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Notes 
 
1 This section is based on Singh (2003). The material presented here updates 
that paper and supersedes it. 
 
2 For the earlier literature on these issues, see Banerjee (1992),Bikhchamdani 
(1992) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000). On a slightly different tack, Minsky 
(1982) made an important contribution to the Keynesian theory of endogeneity 
of financial fragility in capitalist economies even during periods of boom, see 
Kregel (2007). 
 
3  There is a large literature on the subject; Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) are 
the classic reference. See further Ramaswami (2003) and Ocampo et al. (2008) 
for a fuller discussion.  
 
4 In this article Krugman (2008) goes on to explains the role of hedge funds and 
carry trade in aggravating the crisis of financial globalization. 
 
5 Some economists do not favour fiscal expansion as a means of stemming the 
crisis on the grounds that the recapitalization of banks should be sufficient (see, 
for example, Greenspan, 2008). 
 
6 See, for example, various contributions in Ocampo et al (2008).  See also 
Ocampo and Taylor (2000). 
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